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We use VARs to study the transmission of shocks in Argentina during the currency board 
regime. We focus on shocks to international commodity prices, U.S. monetary policy, the 
real effective exchange rate, and the sovereign risk premium on emerging market debt. Of 
those factors, only the sovereign risk premium affects output significantly, which we believe 
is really a proxy for beliefs about fiscal solvency. Both the monetary base and money market 
interest rates react to U.S. monetary policy, but such shocks do not affect Argentine output 
significantly. Finally, it does not appear that the appreciation of the U.S. dollar affected the 
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1. Introduction 
 
The adoption by the Argentine authorities of the one-for-one peso/dollar currency board 
regime in 1991 signaled a drastic departure from the previously failed attempts at economic 
stabilization and reform. By having monetary policy tied to that of the U.S., it was argued, a 
credible hard peg would rapidly anchor expectations and would provide some of the 
necessary conditions for achieving a balanced growth path. The tight standard for monetary 
policy was followed by a new charter for the central bank that formally established its 
independence and by a reduction in the barriers to capital flows. The new regime also 
ushered in a period of market-oriented reforms, especially in the financial sector. Growth 
picked up and, after a transition period, inflation was reduced into single digits. As the 
macroeconomic environment stabilized and the country withstood the fallout from the 
Mexican Tequila crisis, Argentina’s choice of a hard peg gained further credibility. However, 
after the initial years of strong growth, a period of protracted stagnation followed. Ultimately, 
during 2001-2002 the country was thrown into political and economic turmoil, and the 
currency board regime was abandoned.  
 
In this paper, we pick up the empirical question how strongly shocks, and external shocks in 
particular, are transmitted in an economy that operates under a currency board. The textbook 
open macro treatment of a small economy that operates under a hard peg regime with few 
barriers to capital flows predicts that such shocks are transmitted quite strongly, essentially 
because the monetary authority has neither the exchange rate instrument nor domestic credit 
policy (open market operations) available to lean against the wind. Consequently, if domestic 
prices do not have enough (downward) flexibility, then adverse shocks might lead to 
protracted downturns. To address this question empirically, we use monthly data from 
Argentina to estimate a ‘semi-structural’ VAR model that includes prices, output, the interest 
rate and money as key domestic variables, in addition to four variables that we consider to 
largely ‘external’ in origin. These four external sources of business cycle variation are: 
international commodity prices, U.S. monetary policy actions, real exchange rate shocks, and 
finally the external borrowing premium for emerging economies.  To identify the empirical 
model, we impose a set of short-run identification restrictions that are quite standard in the 
VAR literature, applied to the particular case of a small country that has adopted a currency 
board regime. This approach allows us to capture some features of the currency board regime 
while keeping the model parsimonious enough that it can be estimated with only nine years 
of monthly observations. 
 
There are at least three reasons why an empirical analysis of the transmission of shocks into 
Argentina is relevant. First, we contribute to a growing literature that documents evidence on 
the international transmission of innovations in monetary policy – and shocks to U.S. 
monetary policy in particular. So far, most of this literature has focused on the transmission 
across large economies with floating currencies, such as the G-7 countries. For example, 
Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) report that U.S. monetary policy contractions lead to 
persistent nominal and real appreciations of the dollar (against five major currencies), and 
increase short-term interest rates more in the U.S. than abroad. Kim and Roubini (2000) also 
study the response to a contractionary U.S. monetary policy action by the economies of the    3
non-U.S. G-7 members. They find that in those countries, short-term interest rates tend to 
increase, monetary aggregates decrease (except in France and Japan), prices initially rise 
(except in UK), and exchange rates depreciate initially with later evidence of overshooting. 
However, variation in U.S. monetary policy generally explains little of the variation in 
domestic industrial production (in the order of 3-10 percent), except for Canada. Kim (2001) 
reaches similar conclusions in a study that includes a wider range of macroeconomic 
indicators. Argentina’s hard peg to the dollar offers another opportunity to look at the degree 
to which monetary policy is transmitted internationally. More concretely, we ask the 
question: Did U.S. monetary policy shocks transmit into the Argentine economy? And if so, 
how strongly were these shocks transmitted? The answers to these questions do not only 
complement findings from previous research, they may also help our understanding of how 
to weigh the costs of surrendering the monetary policy option against its benefits, particularly 
in light of the Federal Funds Rate tightening of the late 1990s.  
 
The second motivation for focusing on external shocks – in addition to U.S. monetary shocks 
– is that that there is evidence that such shocks are important sources of business cycle 
variation. Kim and Roubini (2000) report that external shocks alone easily explain more than 
one third of the variation in output for the non-U.S. G-7 economies, particularly over the 
medium run. How does this finding extend to Argentina? What types of external shocks were 
particularly potent? Indeed, by maintaining a hard peg, Argentina could have left itself more 
vulnerable to such shocks than countries that opted for more flexible exchange rate 
arrangements (Brazil and Mexico, for example). 
 
Third and finally, there has been considerable debate on what led to the economic crisis of 
2001-2002 and the subsequent collapse of the currency board.
2 The usual suspects and 
accomplices include but are not limited to: inflexibility of currency board regime, fixing the 
peso to the wrong currency, lack of fiscal discipline, labor market inflexibility, a debt-
deflation spiral, and the fallout of adverse external events in the latter half of the 1990s. For 
example, de la Torre, Levy Yeyati and Schmukler (2003) argue that the country fell into a 
currency-growth-debt trap and claim that “the trap was in no small part due to major external 
shocks” (p. 8). On the other hand, Perry and Servén (2002) concluded that “Argentina was 
not hit harder than other Latin American countries by the terms of trade decline after the 
Asian crisis, nor by the US and worldwide slowdown in 2001, nor by the capital flows 
reversal and the rise in spreads after the Russian crisis. As a consequence, the fact that 
Argentina did worse than other countries after 1999 must be attributed to her higher 
vulnerabilities to shocks, weaker policy responses or a combination of both.” (p. 3) We do 
not have much confidence in the ability of a VAR methodology to directly analyze the 2001-
2002 collapse or to identify specific ‘suspects’. However, VAR impulse response functions 
can provide empirical evidence on how strongly the domestic economic variables respond to 
various types of shocks, and variance decompositions provide some measure for assessing 
                                                 
2 For example, see The Economist (2002), Hausman and Velasco (2002), Mussa (2002), 
Perry and Servén (2002), and de la Torre, Levy Yeyati and Schmukler (2003), among others.   4
the relative importance of those sources of business cycle variation. In that sense, our 
findings can complement other types of research and offer additional insights.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The second section describes and motivates the 
choice of variables that we use in the estimation. It also discusses a convenient 
decomposition of the real exchange rate. In section three, the VAR methodology and the 
identification restrictions are discussed in detail. Section four reports the main findings of the 
estimations, based on the variance decompositions and impulse responses. Section five 
continues to discuss the empirical results and concludes.   
 
2. The Data 
 
This section describes the data that is used in the estimations. We have monthly observations 
on a vector of macroeconomic variables over the period 1993:01 through 2001:02, which 
covers most of the currency board period. We exclude the first few months of the currency 
board regime (that is, those months in 1991-1992) to allow the initial adjustment of the 
economy towards the new regime to take effect. We also exclude the observations towards 
the end of the hard peg regime, since the final months of the currency board regime were 
marred by increased political and economic uncertainty and eventually a full-blown crisis.  
 
Our data vector takes the following variables: {P, Y, MMR, M, FFR, COM, JPM, ER}.
3  The 
main domestic variables of interest are prices P , output Y , the money market interest rate 
MMR, and the monetary aggregate M . The additional variables are: the U.S. Federal Funds 
Rate FFR, an international commodity price index COM , a measure of the sovereign risk 
spread JPM , and finally a real exchange rate measure ER. We now describe each of these 
variables in more detail. The variables P  and Y  are the consumer price index and index of 
industrial production respectively (with base year 1995). Although broader measures of 
prices and output might be preferable, the availability of monthly frequencies determined our 
choice. Next, the variable MMR is the money market interest rate, and M  is the monetary 
base. We use the monetary base instead of broader money measures such as  1 M  or  2 M  
because the design feature of the currency board regime implies that domestic authorities 
give up control over high-powered money. Broader measures of money may be affected by 
shocks to the monetary base and by other factors, including the institutional changes in the 
financial sector and other money velocity shocks. We leave for future research the effects of 
the currency board regime on broad money or credit measures.  
 
We now describe the other, ‘external’ variables, beginning with the Federal Funds Rate 
(FFR). There are several reasons why we include U.S. monetary policy in our model. First, 
we already mentioned empirical studies that U.S. monetary policy actions affect other 
                                                 
3 Unless otherwise indicated, the data is taken from the IMF International Financial Statistics 
(IFS) database.   5
economies. Second, movements in U.S. interest rates, and changes in the stance of U.S. 
monetary policy in particular, are likely to be relevant to Argentina because of its hard peg to 
the dollar combined with free capital mobility. This leaves open the question of why we use 
FFR. Bernanke and Blinder (1992) provide strong arguments that the Federal Funds Rate is 
a good measure of the stance of U.S. monetary policy. Furthermore, we believe that FFR 
serves is a good measure of ‘the U.S. interest rate’ since other U.S. money market rates 
follow movements in the Federal Funds rate closely. 
 
Next, we include in our specifications an index of international commodity prices (COM). 
We include this variable because it may capture supply shocks as well as serve as a proxy for 
future inflation. It is well known in the VAR literature that so so-called ‘price puzzle’ (in 
which contractionary monetary policy shocks increase the price level) disappears when a 
variable that proxies for future inflation is included in the specification.
4 We follow the 
literature and give COM a non-zero contemporaneous coefficient in the Federal Funds Rate 
equation. We also allow domestic prices to be affected by COM. By doing so, we feel more 
confident that shocks to the Federal Funds Rate truly represent innovations in U.S. monetary 
policy, rather than an endogenous reaction that may affect Argentina through other channels 
as well.  
 
A third source of variation that we include in our empirical model comes from  JPM , the JP 
Morgan sovereign spread of the EMBI emerging markets bond index.
5 Most generally, 
JPM may contain information about the international capital markets’ assessment of the 
health of emerging economies in general, and their budgetary accounts in particular.  
Because a fraction of the emerging market debt was issued by Argentina, variation in this 
index has external and domestic components.
6 Variation in JPM that has external origins 
may include the Mexican peso and Brazilian real crises and the Russian default. In spite of 
their foreign origins, those events may increase the scrutiny of Argentina’s public finances 
and change the outlook of its sustainability. Alternatively, some of the information contained 
in  JPM may be domestic in nature, such as new economic and political developments or an 
IMF report. In summary, although we cannot be sure about the exact origins of the shocks to 
JPM  (whether domestic or foreign), we view variation in the index largely as a proxy for 
changes in the budgetary outlook. Thus, we include JPM  in our VAR specifications to 
analyze how the domestic variables are affected by such changes. 
 
                                                 
4 For example, see Sims (1992). 
5 This index is available from Bloomberg. 
6 Ideally, we wish to separate out domestic influences from external ones, but indexes that 
exclude Argentina were not available for the entire sample period (it is hard to argue that 
such separate components would be orthogonal anyway). Instead, we allow for 
contemporaneous interaction in the VAR model.    6
The final variable that needs explaining is the real effective exchange rate ER. We define the 
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In this expression,  Arg P  and  USA P  are the price levels of Argentina and the U.S. respectively, 
0 e  is the nominal dollar/peso exchange rate (equal to one during 1991-2001) and  0 α  is the 
share of Argentina’s trade that with the U.S. The  i P ,  i e , and  i α  have the same interpretation, 
but applied to the  n i , , 1K =  other trading partners. The trade weights sum to one, that is: 
1 1 0 = + + + n α α α K , and are calculated as the fraction of each country in Argentina’s total 
imports plus exports. The  i e  are expressed in terms of foreign currency per peso. We express 
the real exchange rate as an index with base 1995 = 100. Note that, as defined, an 
appreciation in the real exchange rate shows up as an increase in the index. How much of the 
variation in  Arg REER  is due to the hard peg with the dollar? To answer this question, we 
decompose  Arg REER  into parts that capture the link of the peso to the dollar, and parts that 
capture other sources of real exchange rate variation. To do this, we first define  USA REER , 
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In  USA REER , the nominal exchange rates (foreign currency per dollar) are denoted by s, and 
the trade weights by β  (with  1 1 0 = + + + n β β β K ).
7  It is easy to show that  Arg REER  can be 
decomposed as follows: 
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7 The α  and β  trade weights  were calculated as each trading partner’s share in total imports 
plus exports of Argentina and the U.S. respectively (averages over the sample period), using 
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Thus, we find that  Arg REER  is decomposed into three parts. The first part is  Arg USA REER \ , 
defined as the U.S. real effective exchange rate excluding Argentina. Because Argentina is a 
small trading partner for the U.S. (about 0.5 percent) this term is essentially the U.S. real 
effective exchange rate. The second part in the decomposition of  Arg REER  is  ArgUSA RER , 
which is simply the bilateral real exchange rate between Argentina and the U.S. During the 
currency board period  1 0 = e , thus variation in  ArgUSA RER  merely reflects inflation 
differentials. Finally, the third term in the  Arg REER  decomposition is  USA Arg REER − . This term 
is similar to  Arg REER , but now each trading partner j is given a weight  j j β α −  
( n j , , 0 K = ).  
 
How do we interpret  USA Arg REER − ? Suppose first that Argentina’s trade patterns resemble 
those of the U.S. In that case,  0 ≈ − j j β α  and therefore  1 ≈ −USA Arg REER . In that case, 
movements in  Arg REER  will closely resemble those of  USA REER . In particular, any 
movements due to dollar fluctuations will affect both the U.S. and Argentina real effective in 
similar ways. If on the other hand,  0 ≠ − j j β α  and thus both countries have very different 
trade patterns, then  1 ≠ −USA Arg REER . In that case, exchange rate shocks will affect  Arg REER  
in ways quite different from  USA REER . To put it differently, the term  USA Arg REER −  captures 
the variation in  Arg REER  that stems from the extent to which Argentina’s foreign trade 
patterns differ from those of the U.S., the anchor country. Furthermore, since the hard peg 
regime is a nominal anchor that prevents Argentina from using the exchange rate instrument 
to adjust to shocks with its major trading partners,  USA Arg REER −  may be interpreted as a 
‘mismatch measure’ for the hard peg. Table 1 shows, for both countries, the top five foreign 
trade partners over the sample period. It is clear that there are indeed substantial differences 
in the foreign trade patterns of both countries. For example, while the top five trading 
partners for the U.S. add to 52.3 percent of that country’s foreign trade, those same countries 
have a combined trade share of only 12.7 percent in Argentina. Conversely, Argentina’s top 
five trading partners (excluding the U.S. itself) have a 41.4 percent share in overall trade, 
accounting for only 9.1 percent of U.S. trade. Bilateral trade between Argentina and the U.S. 
accounts for 15 percent and 0.5 percent respectively of those countries’ overall foreign trade.  
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
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Of course, not only do differences in trade patterns matter, but also the size of the shocks to 
the various countries will affect how closely  Arg REER  follows  USA REER . Figure 1 shows the 
evolution of  Arg REER  against its three subcomponents, each expressed as an index with base 
1995 = 100, and calculated over the period 1992-2001. It is quite clear from Figure 1 that, 
although overall  Arg REER  appears to have appreciated along with  Arg USA REER \ , there are 
significant deviations over the sample period. In particular, the real depreciation during 1994-
1995 and the appreciation in 1999 are captured by variation in  USA Arg REER − . We report 
estimates that use  Arg REER  and  Arg USA REER \  as measures of ER. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
This completes the description of the data vector. In the next section we discuss in detail the 
VAR methodology and our identification assumptions.  
 
3. The Empirical Model 
 
3.a. VAR Methodology 
 
We are interested in estimating the following structural model in n variables y with p lags, 
denoted SVAR(p):  
 
(7)  t t t p t p 1 t 1 t 0 b y B y B y B b y B ε ε + = ⇔ + + + + = − − ). ( . . . L K  
 
with  ] . . [ ) (
1 p L L L p 1 0 B B B B K − − ≡ , and L the lag operator. The matrix  0 B  contains the 
contemporaneous coefficients of the model, b is a vector of constants, the  j B  contain the 
coefficients on the p lags of y (for  p j , , 1K = ), and  t ε  is a vector of structural disturbances 
with  0 t = ] [ε E  and  n t t I = ] . [
' ε ε E . One may think of the SVAR(p) representation as a linear 
approximation to some theoretical model. Note that we immediately impose the structural 
errors to be pair wise orthogonal and to have unit variance. As defined, a one-unit shock to 
any of the variables is a shock of a one-standard deviation magnitude, or a ‘typical’ shock. 
Premultiplication of the SVAR(p) model by ( )
1
0 B
−  yields the reduced-form model or VAR(p) 
representation of the model: 
 
(8)  t p t p 1 t 1 t u y A y A a y + + + + = − − . . K  
 
In the VAR(p) representation of the empirical model,  ( ) b B a
1
0 .
− ≡  is a vector of constants, 
the  () j
1
0 j B B A .
− ≡  contain the reduced-form coefficients on the p lags of y (for  p j , , 1K = ), 
and  () t
1
0 t B u ε .
− ≡  is the vector of reduced-form disturbances with  0 ut = ] [ E  and   9
()()




0 t t B B u u
− − = Ω ≡ E . Next, it is convenient and customary to address the dynamic 
responses of the system to a structural shock by tracing out the impulse-responses. The 
impulse responses are obtained from the VMA(∞) representation of the model: 
 
(9)  t t C c y ε ). (L + =  
 
In the VMA(∞) representation,  ( ) b B c
1. ) (
− ≡ L  is a vector of constants and  []
1 B C
− ≡ ) ( ) ( L L  
contains the impulse response coefficients. Finally, we report the results of the historical 
variance decomposition, which shows that fraction of the variation that is due to variation in 
each of the respective variables of the model.
8  
 
The VAR(p) includes only lagged endogenous variables, and thus the reduced form of the 
model can be estimated consistently by OLS. However, since the estimate for Ω contains 
only  2 / ) 1 .( + n n  distinct elements, this is the maximum number of free parameters that can 
be used to retrieve the coefficients of  0 B . The literature has solved this identification 
problem in different ways, including by imposing short-run and/or long-run restrictions. In 
our study we impose only short-run restrictions on  0 B , as this allow us avoid the problem of 
having to impose long-run restrictions with less than ten years of monthly observations.
9 In 
addition, as will become clear below, our restrictions have a simple theoretical interpretation 
and do not impose too much structure on the model. Note also that since  () t
1
0 t B u ε .
− ≡  it 
follows that  t 0 t u B . ≡ ε . Thus, we interpret the restrictions in terms of innovations rather than 
restrictions on the levels of the variables. Since  0 B has been given ones on its diagonal axis, 
we have  2 / ) 1 .( − n n  necessary identification restrictions for the model to be identified. A 
popular approach has been to constrain  0 B  to be lower triangular. However, it is well known 
that the inferences drawn from such a recursive system are not invariant to the ordering of the 
variables, and it is often hard to give such models a structural interpretation. Since Bernanke 
(1986) and Sims (1986), nonrecursive exclusion restrictions on  0 B  have been widely used. 
Next we discuss the identification restrictions in more detail. 
 
3.b. Identification of the Empirical Model 
 
In this section we discuss our basic identification strategies. We start with a baseline model 
that uses the vector of variables {COM, FFR, P, Y, MMR, M}. We then proceed to discuss 
the extended models, with variables those from the baseline model plus one additional 
variable. These additional variables are either the real exchange rate ER (or more precisely, 
                                                 
8 See Hamilton (1994), p. 323-324 for details.  
9 For the same reason, we do not consider cointegration analysis.   10
one of the exchange rate measures Arg REER  or Arg USA REER \ ), or the sovereign spread JPM.
10 
Reporting the results from the baseline model first and then extending the baseline model is 
done to facilitate comparison and serves as a robustness check. We include ER and JPM 
separately for two reasons. First, including both variables together would increase the 
dimension of y to eight and thus consume precious degrees of freedom and make the 
estimates less precise. Second, both ER and JPM may react to similar information (e.g., the 
response to the Brazilian real depreciation), which could make the estimates less precise. On 
those grounds, including ER and JPM separately seems both reasonable and desirable. This 



























































































JPM y  
Next we look at the restrictions on  0 B  for each of the three specifications. For the baseline 
model, the identification restrictions on  0 B  are summarized in the following relation between 



















































































1 * * * 0 0
* 1 0 0 * 0
0 0 1 0 0 *
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0 0 0 0 1 *









The  i ε  are the structural-form disturbances for the commodity index, the Federal Funds Rate, 
prices, output, money supply and money demand respectively. The  i u  are the reduced-form 
disturbances of the variables, and the nonzero elements of the matrix  0 B  are denoted by ‘*’. 
We now describe each of the equations in more detail. The first line is that of the commodity 
price index (COM), which we take as contemporaneously exogenous to Argentina. The 
                                                 
10 Adding variables one by one to a baseline model is sometimes called the ‘marginal 
method’.   11
following line is the Federal Funds Rate (FFR) equation. The U.S. monetary authorities do 
not react contemporaneously to any of the Argentine domestic variables. However, we do 
allow within-the-month reactions to shocks to COM, based on the argument that variation in 
such an index may contain information about future inflation and therefore may help to solve 
or to reduce the ‘prize puzzle’. The third and fourth equations describe equilibrium in the 
market for goods. Within the month, prices adjust to internationally determined commodity 
prices (capturing inflation expectations and/or a simple mark-up rule for the cost of 
commodities) and to output. Output reacts sluggishly to money market variables or prices, 
but is allowed to adjust within the month to shocks to COM. Next, equations five and six 
describe money market equilibrium. Because of the currency board arrangement and open 
borders for capital flows, the central bank does not have the power to set interest rates on its 
own. Instead, in the money supply equation MMR adjusts ‘passively’ to changes in U.S. 
monetary policy FFR  and to shocks to the monetary base M. The money demand equation, 
on the other hand, is fairly conventional. Money demand responds contemporaneously to 
prices, output and domestic interest rates. 
  
Next, we discuss the identification strategies for the models that include ER and JPM, in 
addition to the variables from the baseline specification. Essentially, the extended models are 
augmented versions of the baseline model. For the models with ER  (with  Arg REER  and 
Arg USA REER \ ) and with JPM, the identification restrictions on  0 B  are summarized as follows: 
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0 1 * * * 0 0
0 * 1 0 0 * 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 *
0 0 0 * 1 0 *
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The coefficients  ER ε  and  ER u  ( JPM ε  and  JPM u ) are the structural-form and reduced-form 
innovations of ER (JPM); all other symbols are the same as in the baseline model. For both 
ER and JPM, we impose the restrictions that neither variable affects any other variable 
contemporaneously, but all variables are allowed to affect ER and JPM within the period. In 
both cases, the additional equation can be thought of as the outcome of an international 
arbitrage argument.  
 
This completes the discussion of the VAR methodology and of the identification restrictions 
of the empirical model. In the next section we discuss the results of our estimations.  
   12




Before we discuss our findings, we ask what a textbook Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch style 
framework would predict about the direction of the major variables in response to shocks. 
We have in mind the case of a small economy with a commitment to a hard peg and no 
barriers to capital flows. Also, because of the time span of our data, our time horizon is that 
of the short-term to the medium-term. First, what are the likely effects of a contractionary 
U.S. monetary policy shock? After a positive shock to FRR, we would not expect Y or P to 
increase. The more synchronized U.S./Argentine business cycle movements and the stronger 
the trade links with the U.S. block are, the more likely it is that output will contract. P may 
react with a lag, and may even go up if the Federal Reserve does not anticipate future 
inflation much ahead of time. Ultimately, however, we would expect prices to fall in 
response to a U.S. monetary policy contraction. Also, if there is a liquidity effect then we 
may reasonably expect MMR to rise and  M to fall (due to higher opportunity cost). Once 
inflation expectations adjust, the money market rate should stop overshooting and return to 
normal levels. Next, we consider the likely effects of a shock to JPM, the sovereign risk 
premium. The consequences of such a shock are ambiguous and depend crucially on the 
origins of the premium increase. If the increase in JPM reflects mainly news from other 
countries and there is little or no contagion, then a flight-to-quality argument might lead to a 
increased attractiveness of Argentine financial assets. Under such circumstances, it is 
possible to see an increase in M, and neutral or even expansionary effects on Y. If, on the 
other hand, an increase in JPM comes in part from a reevaluation of Argentine risk in 
response to worsening fiscal balance and deteriorating debt outlook, or if it comes from 
external developments coupled with contagion, then we expect the increase in JPM to have 
contractionary effects. In the latter case, one would expect M and Y  to fall, and MMR  to 
increase to reflect the higher risk premium. Third, we ask what the likely effects are of an 
increase in international commodity prices COM. If we interpret such an increase as a proxy 
for higher future inflation, then we would expect MMR and P to rise, and Y and M to fall in 
response. On the other hand, the rise in international commodity prices may reflect good 
news for Argentine commodities exporters, in which case the price increase may well be 
expansionary. Fourth and finally, we consider shocks to the real exchange rate  Arg REER . In 
response to a real exchange rate appreciation, it is reasonable to expect Y and MMR to fall at 
first, followed by a gradual return to long run equilibrium values. The extent to which MMR 
falls may help dampen the output contraction. We distinguish between the transmission of 
shocks that are come from changes in the U.S. real effective exchange rate ( Arg USA REER \ ), 
and those that are due to Argentina’s main trading partners ( USA Arg REER − ). Under a hard peg 
regime, the domestic interest rate MMR  ought to be tied to U.S. rates. In that case it is likely 
that MMR will fall by more in response to a dollar appreciation (when U.S. rates come down 
as well) than it would following a currency depreciation of one of Argentina’s major trading 
partners. If the drop in MMR is large enough, this may dampen or even outweigh the output 
contraction from the loss of international competitiveness. On the other hand, if the exchange 
rate appreciation comes from non-dollar sources and MMR does not react strongly, then it is   13
more likely that output will be lost. Next, we report and discuss the estimation results of the 
various specifications.  
 
4.b. Estimation Results from the Baseline Model  
 
We estimate the baseline model and the extended models with the measures of the real 
effective exchange rate ( Arg REER  and  Arg USA REER \ ) and with JPM using monthly 
observations over 1993:01-2001:02. In each of the estimations we used six lags.
11 The 
impulse responses are reported in Figures 2-5, and the variance decompositions are presented 
in Tables 3-6.
12 In the figures, each row contains the decomposition or impulse response of a 
single variable to the corresponding shocks in the column. For the non-interest variables, the 
impulse responses are the percentage deviations from an underlying path. The confidence 
bands around the impulse responses are the 16-84 percentiles of a Bayesian simulation 
procedure with 5,000 draws, taking into account the overidentification of the model (see 
Sims and Zha (1999) and RATS (2002) for details). The results of the overidentification tests 
are reported in Table 2.  
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Based on the test statistics, the identification restrictions are not rejected at the usual degrees 
of confidence (for the specification with JPM, the restrictions are rejected at 10 percent 
confidence, but not at 5 percent). Also, when we compare the baseline model (Figure 2) to 
the extended versions (Figures 3-5) that include the real exchange rates and the sovereign 
risk premium, we find that the results of the extended models are quite robust to the inclusion 
of the extra variable. We now discuss the findings of the Baseline specification in greater 
detail.  
 
The results of the baseline specification are summarized in Figure 2 and Table 3. Beginning 
with shocks to COM, we find that these affect prices and money with a lag of a few months. 
In particular, such shocks increase prices (though quantitatively the effects are very small) 
and they reduce the monetary base. Output appears to be declining somewhat within the year, 
but the effect is not statistically significant. Based on the variance decompositions, shocks to 
COM  explain about 10 percent of the variation in prices, money and interest rates (over a 24 
month horizon), but very little of output (three percent or less). These results seem consistent 
                                                 
11 The lag exclusion tests typically indicate that three lags would be sufficient. Although a 
full set of at least twelve lags might be desirable with monthly data, our choice of using six 
lags is in line with other work and is strikes a balance with the length of the data set.  
12 Most of the estimated coefficients of the contemporaneous effects have rather large 
standard errors. The confidence bands in the impulse responses are reasonably narrow, giving 
us confidence that the large standard errors on individual coefficients is most likely due to 
collinearity.    14
with the idea that changes in international commodity prices may serve as a proxy for future 
inflation. The overall reaction of industrial production may be muted perhaps because 
improvements in the prices for exporters of commodities offset the adverse supply effects 
from higher future inflation.  
 
Going to the second column in Figure 2, we find the responses of the domestic variables to 
changes in the stance of U.S. monetary policy, as measured by the Federal Funds Rate. A 
first observation is that contractionary U.S. monetary policy action affects money and interest 
rates in the short run. That is, interest rates rise quickly and up to five months after the shock, 
and the monetary base falls. It takes about one year for the money market to recover, after 
which the monetary base continues to rise. The latter response may be due in part to the 
reaction of the domestic price level to the monetary policy shock. After an initial rise in the 
price level, prices contract significantly after about one year. The initial rise in prices may 
qualify as a ‘price puzzle’, but may also come from other sources such as an imperfect 
alignment of the Argentine and U.S. business cycle. The variance decompositions of prices 
and money confirm the anchor role of U.S. monetary policy, especially over the longer-term 
horizon. Over a 24-month horizon, variation in FFR  explains 14.1 and 21.7 percent of 
variation in prices and money respectively, rising to 23.6 and 27.6 percent over 30 months. In 
fact, FFR is the single dominant factor in explaining variation in those two variables. Also 
interesting is that only 10-14 percent of variation in MMR  is explained by variation in FFR. 
However, most surprisingly perhaps, we find that output does not react significantly to 
shocks to U.S. monetary policy; the point estimates of the impulses show even a slight (and 
statistically insignificant) increase in industrial output following a FFR contraction. The 
variance decompositions lead to a similar finding that U.S. monetary policy is not a major 
source of business cycle variation in Argentina, with variation in FFR explaining only 7-9 
percent of output variation over the short-term and medium term.  
 
Before we move on to discuss the responses of the domestic economy to exchange rate and 
sovereign interest spread shocks, we note some other interesting findings from Figure 2 and 
Table 3. First, in response to shocks to prices, the impulse responses show that output 
increases and money falls significantly. Both output and prices increase in response to a 
money demand shock (increasing M), with the price effect longer-lived. Also, in response to 
a domestic money supply shock (increasing MMR), money falls significantly. Finally, we 
note the importance of variation in the monetary base in explaining output variation, 
especially in the short run. For the very short run (six months), money explains more than 20 
percent of output variation, and over a 30 month period this is still 15.4 percent. This 
completes our description of the findings of the baseline model. Next, we discuss the results 
of the extended models. 
 
[Insert Figure 2 and Table 3 here] 
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4.b. Estimation Results from the Extended Models  
 
We now discuss our findings for the models that include the variables ER (that is:  Arg REER  
and  Arg US REER \ ) and JPM in addition to those variables from the baseline model. The 
estimated impulse responses are reported in Figures 3-5 and the corresponding variance 
decompositions are shown in Tables 4-6. The final column of Figure 3 shows the impulse 
responses of the domestic variables to a shock (appreciation) of Argentina’s real effective 
exchange rate. We find that in response to such a shock, prices fall significantly over the 30 
month horizon and output fall gradually (though the latter is not statistically significant). The 
appreciation also leads to a short-lived drop in interest rates and to a gradual increase in the 
monetary base. By and large, these are short-run effects that can be expected from such an 
appreciation. We also find that real exchange rate variability explains between 16.5 percent 
and 23.5 percent of variation in prices, but that its role in explaining the other domestic 
variables is fairly limited. For example, less than 10 percent of output variation is due to 
variation in the real exchange rate (see Table 4, final column). Note also that the role of FFR  
in the variance decompositions increases, at least for the monetary variables. How important 
is the variation in the U.S. component,  Arg US REER \  in explaining Argentine fluctuations? To 
answer this question, we turn to Figure 4 and Table 5. Based on the variance decompositions 
alone, we must conclude the role of variation in  Arg US REER \  is quite limited. For example, 
less than 1.3 percent of the variation in prices can be attributed to  Arg US REER \ . The variance 
decomposition of output also attributes a rather small role to this component (a maximum of 
10.6 percent, for an 18 month horizon). We reach similar findings when we look at the 
impulse responses (last column of Figure 4). In fact, an appreciation in  Arg US REER \  does not 
seem to lead to a slowdown in output.  
 
Finally, Figure 5 and Table 6 summarize the results of the estimation with JPM  as extra 
variable. Again, the role of the extra variable is borne out in the final column. Two points are 
noteworthy. First, we find that output contracts significantly and for a prolonged period in 
response to an increase in the sovereign risk premium. In fact, based on the variance 
decompositions, JPM  explains up to 25.8 percent of output variation over a one-year 
horizon, and more than 22 percent over the medium term (30 months). Secondly, we find that 
the monetary base responds significantly and for a prolonged period to shocks in JPM. 
However, U.S. monetary policy remains a dominant factor in explaining the variation in the 
monetary base.  
 
[Insert Figures 3-5 and Tables 4-6 here] 
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5. Further Discussion and Conclusions 
 
This paper took up the question: How are shocks transmitted in Argentina during its currency 
board experiment of the 1990s?  To answer this question, we estimated several VAR models 
with quite standard identification restrictions and obtained the variance decompositions and 
impulse responses of prices, output, interest rates and money. By and large, we found that 
shocks to commodity prices, U.S. monetary policy, the real exchange rate and the sovereign 
risk premium are transmitted into the Argentine economy. However, not all domestic 
variables are affected in the same way. We found that (1) prices react with a lag, but the 
quantitative impact is small, (2) the monetary base is affected by all types of shocks, (3) the 
money market interest rate appears to be affected by shocks in the very short run, but overall 
the effects are quite noisy, and (4) output is affected by money market shocks and by shocks 
to the sovereign risk premium. How do we interpret our findings? 
 
First, our results indicate that U.S. monetary policy transmission occurred through nominal 
variables (M, P, MMR). However, the real effects of the monetary policy transmission are 
rather weak. More concretely, we do not find evidence that U.S. monetary policy actions 
played a prominent role in explaining Argentine business cycle movements in the 1990s. 
This is evident by the absence of any significant output response to innovations in U.S. 
monetary policy conditions. Although our results are in line with other studies that found 
rather weak international transmission of monetary policy actions, our prior was that this type 
of transmission would be stronger in the case of Argentina’s currency board regime.  
 
Second, we do not find evidence that the appreciation of the U.S. real exchange rate 
( Arg USA REER \ ) in itself affected the country adversely in any statistically significant way. 
Does this mean that we can conclude then that the currency board did not play a role in 
Argentina’s stagnation towards the final years of the currency board regime? Not necessarily.  
First, even if there is no direct evidence that the U.S. appreciation hurt the real sector in 
Argentina, this does not imply that pegging to the dollar was the optimal choice to make. A 
fix to other currencies or a floating regime might have yielded better results. Second, and 
related to the first point, the currency board regime implies a constraint on the monetary base 
as well as on the exchange rate. We found that the monetary base reacted significantly to 
various types of shocks, and thus the currency board arrangement may have affected the 
economy through the monetary base rather than through the exchange rate channel. Third and 
finally, it might be that the VAR methodology and its focus on policy shocks is not ideal 
approach to analyze the effects of the gradual (or trend) appreciation in the U.S. exchange 
rate. Also, it could be argued that  Arg REER  became overvalued early on and remained above 
any sustainable level throughout the period, mainly because Argentina inflation was reduced 
only gradually over the first two years of the currency board period. With these observations 
in mind, however, our findings that  Arg USA REER \  does not explain much of output variation 
provides little direct support for the hypothesis that the appreciating dollar was a main factor 
behind Argentina’s stagnation. That the country does not exactly qualify as a ‘small open’ 
economy may have played a role in this (the ratio of imports plus exports over GDP is about 
20 percent on average over 1991-2001).   17
 
Third, our empirical evidence shows that shocks to the sovereign risk spread affects both 
output and the money market. That is, we found that shocks to this index led to significant 
drops in output and the monetary base. As mentioned before, we see JPM as a proxy for the 
public financing constraint. More precisely, some of the variation in JPM may reflect at least 
in part shifts in investors’ risk assessment of the ability of the government to continue to 
service its debt (and, by extension, the viability of the currency board regime itself). It is 
interesting to note that its effect is picked up by industrial production, for lack of more 
broadly defined output indicators available on a monthly basis. If a rise in the sovereign risk 
premium affected private financing constraints in the non-industrial sector as well, then the 
effects of the changing risk assessment of the sustainability of government finances on the 
domestic economy could have been more widespread. 
 
Finally, we have the following suggestion for further research. Our findings indicate that the 
currency board regime allowed shocks to affect the monetary base but that, typically, neither 
money market interest rates nor output (industrial production, at least) seemed affected much 
by those shocks. Granted, interest rates pick up in the short run following shocks to either 
FFR  or JPM, but much of its variation remains to be explained. This money market interest 
rate ‘puzzle’ begs the question about the interaction of the monetary base with more broad 
measures of money and credit, and also what the role the financial sector may play in 
explaining this result. Indeed, the degree to which shocks to the monetary base ultimately 
affect the economy may be determined in part by the presence of some financial accelerator 
mechanism or a bank lending channel. Also, the regulatory framework or the adjustment of 
the financial sector itself to the currency board (e.g. via increased presence of foreign banks, 
or by establishing credit lines), may have helped to ‘absorb’ shocks to the money market. 
Because such institutional arrangements and the design of the financial sector are factors in 
the ultimate success of a currency board regime, a closer look inside the financial sector itself 
may be justified. 
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APPENDIX.  Tables and Figures 
 
 
Table 1. Top Five Trading Partners for U.S.A. and Argentina, in percent 
Trading Partner United  States Argentina 
1. Canada  20.2  0.9 
2. Japan  12.2  3.0 
3. Mexico  10.1  1.7 
4. China  5.2  2.8 
5. Germany  4.6  4.3 
Total Share:  52.3  12.7 
Trading Partner United  States Argentina 
1. Brazil  1.5  23.9 
2. Chile  0.4  5.1 
3. Italy  1.9  4.4 
4. Germany  4.6  4.3 
5. Spain  0.7  3.7 
Total Share:  9.1  41.4 
Average share of exports plus imports in overall trade, 1992-2001. 





Table 2. Results From Overidentification Tests 
Model  Test Statistic (D.o.f) Significance  Level 
Baseline 7.4415  (6)  0.2819 
Extended,  Arg REER ER =   4.2678 (6)  0.6405 
Extended,  US Arg REER ER \ =   9.3488 (6)  0.1549 
Extended, JPM   11.2771 (6)  0.0802 
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Table 3. Variance Decomposition of Baseline Model, in percent 
Variance Decomposition of Prices (P) 
Months COM FFR P  Y  MMR M  
6 1.4  7.0  71.5  7.3  0.0  12.7 
12 4.2  6.5  52.2  14.8  0.6  21.7 
18 9.1  6.2  41.7  16.5  0.9  25.6 
24 10.7  14.1  36.2  14.4  0.9  23.7 
30 10.8  23.6  30.7  14.2  0.8  20.0 
Variance Decomposition of Output (Y) 
Months COM FFR P  Y  MMR M  
6 1.5  8.5  2.2  65.1  1.4  21.3 
12 2.1  8.2  3.2  66.1  1.9  18.4 
18 2.4  7.8  7.4  63.7  2.2  16.6 
24 2.4  7.6  10.4  60.8  3.1  15.7 
30 3.0  7.6  11.3  59.2  3.5  15.4 
Variance Decomposition of Money Market Rate (MMR) 
Months COM FFR P  Y  MMR M  
6 2.6  10.6  7.8  2.9  63.3  12.8 
12 9.7  10.5  11.2  4.6  53.1  10.8 
18 9.7  11.9  12.4  4.4  51.2  10.4 
24 10.4  12.9  12.1  4.4  50.0  10.2 
30 11.1  13.1  12.0  4.6  49.2  10.1 
Variance Decomposition of Money (M) 
Months COM FFR P  Y  MMR M  
6 4.0  7.7  12.7  12.9  15.2  47.4 
12 7.6  10.0  10.2  19.9  18.4  33.8 
18 11.8  11.5  9.1  26.4  14.7  26.6 
24 10.1  21.7  9.6  26.3  12.0  20.3 
30 8.6  27.6  10.7  24.8  11.2  17.2 
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Table 4. Variance Decomposition of Model  Arg REER , in percent 
Variance Decomposition of Prices (P) 
Months COM FFR P  Y  MMR M  ER 
6  4.4 22.4  31.8 7.1  7.5 10.3  16.5 
12  3.7 18.9  17.2  13.8 6.8 16.2  23.5 
18  5.2 14.3  11.9  17.9 9.1 19.5  22.1 
24  5.5 21.7 9.5 15.4 9.3 17.5  21.0 
30  5.5 31.3 7.8 13.5 7.9 14.4  19.7 
Variance Decomposition of Output (Y) 
Months COM FFR P  Y  MMR M  ER 
6  1.5  7.1  1.7 64.9 5.9 17.4 1.5 
12  2.4  7.3  2.5 64.8 6.5 15.1 1.4 
18  2.6  8.1  3.2 63.9 6.0 14.0 2.2 
24  2.5  9.1  3.3 60.4 5.6 13.2 5.9 
30  2.8  8.9  3.2 57.4 5.4 12.9 9.5 
Variance Decomposition of Money Market Rate (MMR) 
Months COM FFR P  Y  MMR M  ER 
6  2.6 15.2 3.6  3.2 58.0  13.4 4.0 
12  10.5  15.4 4.8  4.3 49.5  11.3 4.2 
18  10.0  18.1 4.6  4.2 46.7  11.0 5.4 
24  10.2  20.0 4.4  4.2 44.6  10.7 5.9 
30  10.5  20.1 4.3  4.2 44.0  10.8 6.2 
Variance Decomposition of Money (M) 
Months COM FFR P  Y  MMR M  ER 
6  5.0 15.7 2.6 13.9  24.3  34.9 3.7 
12 6.4  19.0  1.8  18.2  20.9  22.6  11.2 
18 8.4  20.3  1.9  20.8  17.3  19.0  12.2 
24  6.9 35.4 1.9 18.6  13.6  14.4 9.1 
30  5.5 45.0 1.9 16.9  11.3  11.5 8.0 
   22
Table 5. Variance Decomposition of Model  Arg US REER \ , in percent 
Variance Decomposition of Prices (P) 
Months COM FFR P  Y  MMR M  ER 
6  1.0 9.4  73.0  5.7 2.6 7.8 0.6 
12  6.3 7.9  55.5  8.5 5.2  16.1  0.5 
18  12.6 7.4 45.5 7.2 10.5  16.3 0.5 
24 13.5  12.7  40.2  7.1  11.1  14.6  0.7 
30 12.9  17.3  36.7  8.5  10.2  13.2  1.3 
Variance Decomposition of Output (Y) 
Months COM FFR P  Y  MMR M  ER 
6  5.4 10.1 2.3 46.5  15.7  15.3 4.8 
12 6.7  9.9  3.6  39.7  17.8  13.2  9.2 
18 6.6  11.2  3.8  37.7  17.4  12.7  10.6 
24  6.2 22.2 3.6 32.4  14.9  10.8 9.8 
30  7.2 32.3 3.0 27.4  12.9 9.0  8.3 
Variance Decomposition of Money Market Rate (MMR) 
Months COM FFR P  Y  MMR M  ER 
6  1.8 12.0 4.6  2.0 52.0  22.7 4.9 
12  10.3  13.1 6.0  2.8 44.6  18.7 4.6 
18  10.3  14.9 6.4  2.9 42.8  18.0 4.6 
24  11.1  18.3 6.1  2.9 40.2  17.0 4.4 
30  11.9  18.9 6.0  2.9 39.4  16.6 4.4 
Variance Decomposition of Money (M) 
Months COM FFR P  Y  MMR M  ER 
6 6.1  9.3  5.9  2.3  57.1  15.1  4.2 
12  6.4 13.6 9.4  2.2 52.2  10.8 5.4 
18  8.9 14.0  10.0 3.3 45.1 9.5  9.2 
24  6.7 28.5 9.1  5.3 32.8 7.2 10.4 
30  5.4 45.9 6.9  6.0 22.3 4.9  8.5 
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Table 6. Variance Decomposition of Model  JPM , in percent 
Variance Decomposition of Prices (P) 
Months COM FFR P  Y  MMR M  JPM 
6  1.9 11.7  66.8 7.3  0.2 11.8 0.4 
12  4.5 8.8  57.2  9.2 1.3  17.5  1.5 
18  7.8 9.8  49.7  7.8 1.5  19.4  4.0 
24  8.3 15.8  44.8 7.6  1.7 17.9 3.8 
30  8.3 18.9  40.4 9.4  1.6 16.2 5.2 
Variance Decomposition of Output (Y) 
Months COM FFR P  Y  MMR M  JPM 
6  2.6  5.4  6.1 60.0 1.2 15.5 9.2 
12  4.0  5.2  5.2 44.8 3.4 11.7  25.8 
18  4.1  4.8  7.3 45.4 3.3 10.9  24.3 
24 3.8  5.3  11.3  42.8  3.8  10.1  22.9 
30  4.4  5.2 12.5  41.3 4.6  9.7 22.4 
Variance Decomposition of Money Market Rate (MMR) 
Months COM FFR P  Y  MMR M  JPM 
6  2.8 12.3 7.2  1.4 58.6  14.3 3.4 
12  11.1  10.6 9.0  4.0 48.5  11.9 4.9 
18 10.6  12.1  10.6  4.2  45.9  11.1  5.4 
24 11.5  12.6  10.5  4.1  44.8  11.0  5.5 
30 12.3  12.5  10.4  4.3  44.1  10.9  5.5 
Variance Decomposition of Money (M) 
Months COM FFR P  Y  MMR M  JPM 
6  3.7 16.9  10.5 4.0 12.0  48.9 4.1 
12 12.3  21.0  7.6 3.9  17.1  27.8  10.2 
18  15.5 17.7  6.5  12.3 14.1 21.8 12.2 
24  12.1 20.0  7.4  16.6 10.9 16.9 16.1 
30  10.7  22.2 8.9 17.4 9.9 14.4  16.5   24
Figure 1. Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) and Components (1995 = 100) 
REER Argentina REER USA (excluding Argentina)







REER Argentina REER Argentina, trade weight differences







REER Argentina Bilateral RER Argentina and USA








Source: International Financial Statistics, Directions of Trade Statistics, and Own Calculations  
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